Three US-based scientists, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, were awarded the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics “for their studies on how institutions are formed and affect prosperity,” the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences reported on Monday.
One of the most cited books by two of the authors is “Why Nations Fail,” which has a reference to Mexico.
The central hypothesis of their work is: rich countries are rich because they have inclusive political and economic institutions, while poor countries are poor because they have extractive economic and political institutions*.
As stated by Dr. Denise Dresser, the authors “point to Carlos Slim and the harmful persistence of crony capitalism that generates poverty, inequality and low economic growth.” In the words of the authors:
In Mexico, Carlos Slim did not make money through innovation. At first, he excelled in stock market deals and in buying and modernizing companies that were not profitable. Her masterstroke was the acquisition of Telmex, the Mexican telecommunications monopoly that was privatized by President Carlos Salinas in 1990. The government announced its intention to sell 51 percent of the voting shares (20.4 percent of total shares) in the company in September 1989 and received bids in November 1990. Although Slim did not make the highest offer, a consortium led by his Grupo Carso won the auction**.
The political scientist commented on her social networks this Monday: “Many of the reforms of AMLO/Morena/Sheinbaum run in the opposite direction to the path they point out. And we will continue to be an example of a country that constantly sabotages itself.”
Robinson has visited Mexico several times to present her approaches in academic institutions, for which she edited a specific article on our country, available on the University of Chicago website: Why regions fail: the Mexican case (See full text below).
Speaking about Mexico, he points out that “Extractive political institutions consist of two important dimensions. First, they distribute political power in a few hands. Second, they present a central state that is not strong because it does not provide key public goods.”*
The academic stated that in states in the south of Mexico (Oaxaca and Chiapas) poverty was maintained due to the persistence of economic institutions that determine inequality, supported by extractive political institutions.
The worst of these combinations is found, as is the case of Chiapas and Oaxaca, when exploitation is added to the abandonment of a weak state.*
In his 2013 article, Robinson pointed out that to solve the problem, the way political institutions functioned first had to be changed and, after that, economic institutions would change.
Dr. Ángel Calderón, professor-researcher at the Center for Economic Studies at El Colegio de México, spoke last year with Dr. James A. Robinson about his career, research and contributions to the fields of economics, political science and economic history. (In English):
Source: aristeguinoticias
