Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s recent remarks have ignited a debate over the relationship between the Sinaloa Cartel and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN). Petro suggested that the Sinaloa Cartel is the “current boss” of the ELN, implying a subordinate relationship that remains unproven.
During the inauguration of a scientific complex in Bucaramanga, Colombia, in early February, Petro emphasized the importance of education in preventing young people from joining armed groups. He highlighted that “Mexican and foreign cartels” pay young Colombians to kill their own brothers, as seen in Catatumbo. Petro asserted that the true “owners of these structures are not Colombian commanders, but those from Mexican groups who buy cocaine.”
His comments came amid escalating violence in Catatumbo, a region near the Venezuelan border. The ELN launched a large-scale offensive against dissidents from the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), reigniting a territorial war that has displaced over 50,000 people in just a month.
Contrary to Petro’s claims, Mexican cartels have not established their own structures in Colombia to control cocaine production and trafficking. Their presence remains sporadic and reliant on local actors. While they have forged alliances with armed groups in Colombia to secure the cocaine supply chain, the ELN’s history suggests it maintains autonomy. Colombia has always been a hostile environment for foreign criminal actors, forcing Mexican cartels to rely on emissaries—business representatives and quality control supervisors who oversee the entire process, from coca cultivation to cocaine packaging and transportation.
Rather than imposing direct control, Mexican emissaries focus on quality control and optimizing the supply chain, reducing risks and cutting out intermediaries without getting involved in local conflicts. Geographical, political, and social conditions have made it difficult for Mexican cartels to establish permanent bases, limiting their ability to operate without local support.
This longstanding arrangement has proven effective, with Colombian criminal groups maintaining enduring partnerships with Mexican groups for drug trafficking while retaining territorial control. Given these limitations, Mexican groups have opted to solidify alliances with local armed actors, including the ELN, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), and FARC dissidents. These partnerships have allowed them to guarantee cocaine trafficking routes from key regions such as Cauca, Catatumbo, and Córdoba to Caribbean ports, facilitating exports to North America and Europe.
As Mexican cartels gain secure access to cocaine production and transportation, Colombian groups retain territorial control and operate under their own interests, avoiding subjugation. This dynamic reinforces the power of Colombian organizations, which capitalize on external demand without relinquishing autonomy. Despite their financial influence, Mexican cartels continue to face significant barriers to operating independently in Colombia, an inhospitable environment for foreign criminal actors.
Source: In Sight Crime
