In national security, intelligence is not just about intercepting communications. It consists of assigning value to information—from open or closed sources—when it translates into the ability to anticipate risks.
Faced with threats, intelligence needs foresight to organize possible futures before the most unfavorable one prevails through the force of events.
In Mexico, we must think this way about the period from August to October 2026. Once the USMCA review concludes and the World Cup euphoria fades, the relationship with the United States could enter a period of extraordinary pressure.
If Trump enters the fall needing a dramatic move ahead of the November midterm elections, few issues would offer him as much symbolic benefit as Mexico: the border, fentanyl, cartels, and sovereignty, all in one package.
That is the key to the “October surprise.” The idea is not a classic invasion or a prolonged territorial occupation—costly and difficult-to-sustain scenarios—but rather a limited, spectacular, and electorally profitable unilateral US action.
A precision strike on a border transport, a special forces incursion, a drone operation in the “Golden Triangle,” a temporary military occupation of border points, a naval blockade in the Gulf of Mexico, or any show of force presented to the American public as an act of self-defense against “narco-terrorism.”
Its purpose would not be to solve Mexico’s security problem, but to produce an image of command for domestic electoral consumption.
Therefore, risk analysis must be professional. Foresight tools such as Regnier’s Abacus, which measures consensus and disagreement among experts on specific threats; the Alliances and Conflicts, Tactics, Objectives, and Recommendations Matrix (MACTOR), which identifies actors with the real capacity to influence or hinder decisions; and the Delphi method for formulating scenarios are essential.
All of these methodologies are useful for identifying the likelihood that the White House would consider unilateral action against Mexico profitable, the possible ways in which it might take such action, and how Mexico should act to neutralize or avoid the worst-case scenarios.
Looking at the map, at least three possible scenarios emerge. The first is the most dangerous: the October surprise. On the eve of the election, Washington executes a surgical strike against criminal targets in Mexican territory without coordination with the Mexican government.
The operational damage to criminal organizations might be limited, but the intended political effect would be enormous.
The second scenario doesn’t produce televised explosions, but it does produce a constant erosion: cooperation with covert subordination. Mexico avoids public humiliation, and the United States avoids the cost of an open violation, but in return, U.S. operational autonomy in intelligence, advising, tactical coordination, and presence in sensitive areas is quietly expanded.
This is the scenario that preserves economic functionality and reduces media tension, although it normalizes a gradual deterioration of the Mexican state’s decision-making power.
The third scenario: a multilateral shield. It involves building, before the crisis hits, a network of interests that makes any unilateralism prohibitively expensive. The governors of southern US border states, American businesses that depend on integrated manufacturing, and the Midwestern states that rely on just-in-time supply chains would clearly understand that a shock to Mexico would be a blow to the US economy itself.
Therein lies the main structural constraint: interdependence. A severe disruption at the border would hit jobs, inflation, supply chains, and industrial production in the United States.
Trump may find an image of strength profitable; it would be more difficult for him to manage a self-inflicted manufacturing recession in the midst of an election cycle, especially after the inflationary process unleashed by the war with Iran.
But this limit doesn’t operate on its own: Mexico must make it visible and costly, strengthening its detection capabilities, targeting criminal finances, establishing red lines of sovereignty, preparing an immediate legal response, speaking not only to Washington, but also to voters and employers in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Arizona, where Mexican stability translates directly into local jobs, and above all, maintaining internal consensus around a policy of collaboration without subordination.
Suggested reading: “National Security in Mexico: Reflections and Proposals from Experience” by Alejandro Alegre, Jorge Carrillo Olea, Luis Herrera-Lasso, Eduardo Medina Mora, Jorge Tello, and Guillermo Valdés (Pluma de Bambú).
Source: elfinanciero
