In 2026, the United States has been raising the stakes in its strategic rivalry with China in Latin America. The Trump administration’s recent decision to revoke the visas of Chilean officials who apparently supported the construction of an undersea internet cable to China seems intended to draw a clear red line on investments in sensitive areas throughout the region. A report published last month by the U.S. Congress sounding the alarm on Chinese space-related infrastructure in Latin America also reinforced rising concern in Washington that pressure has so far been insufficient to stop Beijing’s advances.
In that context, Mexico is—once again—uniquely exposed. It is the U.S.’s largest trading partner, a corridor for migration and fentanyl, and—crucially—a potential gateway for Chinese goods, capital, and technology into the U.S. market. From Washington’s perspective, no other country concentrates as many strategic concerns in one place.
While Canada is hedging, diversifying its trade ties beyond the U.S. and cautiously warming relations with China, Mexico has opted for a different approach: making concessions in the hope that bilateral irritants will dissipate. President Claudia Sheinbaum has raised tariffs on imports into Mexico from countries with which it has no trade agreements.
Authorities have cracked down on companies suspected of using Mexico to circumvent U.S. tariffs, including probes into hundreds of firms importing Asian steel through programs like IMMEX, part of an effort to prevent “triangulation” of Chinese products into the U.S. market. And economy ministry officials have also quietly pressured state governments to stall Chinese automakers’ direct manufacturing investments in Mexico—including bids by BYD and Geely to acquire a Nissan-Mercedes plant in Aguascalientes—pending the outcome of ongoing U.S. trade negotiations.
Nevertheless, these moves reflect less a coherent industrial policy shift than a calculated gesture of alignment in light of this year’s review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement, or USMCA. Overall, Mexico’s response to China remains partial and reactive, when a coherent strategy is needed.
While recent trade measures address visible flows, they leave deeper vulnerabilities untouched: China’s expanding footprint in strategic infrastructure, digital networks, and security-sensitive technologies.
Hutchison Ports—part of the Hong Kong–based conglomerate CK Hutchison Holdings, whose subsidiary recently lost control of port terminals at both ends of the Panama Canal after the U.S. voiced security concerns—remains the private operator with the largest presence in Mexico’s port system. Since arriving in 1999 at the port of Manzanillo, the company has expanded its network to seven terminals across five strategic ports—Ensenada, Manzanillo, Lázaro Cárdenas, Veracruz, and Altamira—handling roughly 35% to 40% of the country’s containerized cargo and a significant share of national container traffic through its Lázaro Cárdenas Terminal (LCT).
Recent investments reflect a long-term commitment. Last November, Hutchison committed $189 million for the second phase of LCT’s expansion—about 40% of all private investment planned for that port through 2028—while in Ensenada, it invested $125 million to extend the dock and increase refrigerated container connections from 288 to 720 units.
With a concession in Veracruz running through 2041 and operations in 24 countries managing 87.5 million TEU globally in 2024, Hutchison Ports has consolidated its position as the most consequential private actor in the trans-Pacific maritime corridor linking Asia and Mexico.
Another difficult truth is that Mexico still lacks a consolidated and transparent picture of China’s footprint in its economy—where capital is embedded, through what ownership and financing structures, and with what implications for data governance, logistics corridors, energy systems, and industrial resilience. Official figures on Chinese investment diverge substantially from independent estimates, and part of that capital enters through offshore vehicles.
The opacity even extends to basic market data: In Mexico’s automotive sector, only 11 of the 28 light-vehicle brands operating in the country report sales figures to the national statistics agency (INEGI), despite the legal requirement. Given that Mexico is now the most important market for Chinese vehicles, surpassing Russia, the lack of information highlights the issue’s significance. Without a comprehensive overview of Chinese companies’ presence, policy responses may remain reactive instead of strategic.
Source: americasquarterly
