Last Tuesday, Secretary of Security and Citizen Protection Omar García Harfuch stated that the two warring factions of the Sinaloa Cartel have been weakened by government action and offered some figures to support this claim: nearly 1,500 arrests, the seizure of more than 3,000 weapons, the dismantling of 91 drug labs, and the confiscation of 53,000 kilos of drugs. This does not include the more than 10,000 troops deployed in the state. These are significant figures, which show that the federal government has focused on containing the violence in Sinaloa, although all of this has not translated into a cessation of hostilities.
At the same time, he indicated that the federal government’s priority objective is the capture of the leaders of both factions: sons of the organization’s historical leaders, on the one hand, Iván Archivaldo and Jesús Alfredo Guzmán Salazar, sons of “El Chapo” and therefore leaders of Los Chapitos, and on the other, Ismael Zambada Sicairos, son of “El Mayo” and leader of La Mayiza.
This has led some media outlets to hypothesize about the end of the Sinaloa Cartel, which will undoubtedly always be a possibility, but these types of projections must be cautious for three fundamental reasons:
First, despite the results presented by Omar García Harfuch, these have not halted the spiral of violence in Sinaloa. According to figures published by the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System, in May and June of this year, we had 140 and 156 intentional homicides in Sinaloa, while from January to April, between 100 and 109 homicides were recorded per month. If we add to this the fact that in the last four months of 2024, the highest figure was found in October with 141 homicides, we can infer that in recent months we have seen an upswing in violence in that state, despite the arrests and seizures. So, assuming it’s true that the government’s actions have hit Los Chapitos and La Mayiza, we could say it’s not enough to slow the hostilities.
Second: It’s very rare for drug cartels to disappear completely, even if they lose relevance. For example, the Beltrán Leyva cartels gradually fragmented after Arturo Beltrán Leyva was killed in 2009, but they continue to exist in Sinaloa and Sonora, under the command of Fausto Isidro Meza. The Knights Templar were significantly diminished after most of their leaders were arrested or killed in 2015. Despite their much lower power than 10 years ago, there are still cells in Michoacán operating under that name. The Gulf Cartel has split into several factions, such as the Rojos, the Metros, and the Escorpiones-Ciclones, but all three still retain the organization’s original name. Even the Zetas, who no longer exist as a criminal brand, remain alive through the organizations that branched off from the original organization, as the Northeast Cartel, Old School Zetas, New Blood Zetas, and Pura Gente Nueva emerged from them. Among the few examples of organizations that have disappeared in the last two decades are the Oaxaca and Colima Cartels, which merged with the Sinaloa Cartel, the Barbie organization, and the Teo faction of the Tijuana Cartel.
In other words, it seems unlikely that the Sinaloa Cartel will disappear, although it is very plausible that it will begin to lose power and relevance. In fact, it is no longer the most powerful organization in Mexico, and now the CJNG occupies that position. Nor can it be said that it is a single organization, since there are at least two, the Chapitos and the Mayiza, which could become more in the future.
Third: they have extensive territories, a large business flow, as well as international contacts and alliances that make it difficult for them to disappear completely. We have seen this with other organizations: drug cartels have a broad capacity for adaptation and the possibility of leadership and member turnover. For example, it is possible to arrest all the Guzmán and Zambada families, and yet there will still be new leaders from other families to replace them. This will undoubtedly cause turbulence and internal disputes. It is likely that there will never again be an undisputed and unifying leadership within the Sinaloa Cartel, but it is foreseeable that some of the criminal cells that currently make up the organization will remain important in the future, at least in some areas of the country.
In this regard, we can offer three alternative hypotheses for the disappearance of this organization:
Which is practically what has happened over the last year: a struggle between two factions, where some battles are won, territories are conquered, and blows are dealt to the rival, but neither faction has enough strength to annihilate the other. Therefore, the dispute drags on for years, slowly wearing down both factions, but without causing any of them to disappear.
Today, the Sinaloa Cartel is split in two, but nothing prevents it from further fragmentation. Ultimately, there are many regional cells with considerable power and influence that could well become independent organizations. In this regard, there are some factors that could accelerate this process, such as the arrest of the leaders of the current factions or the disruption of one group’s interests, making it more profitable for them to become independent. For example, the Cabreras could perfectly have an independent organization in Durango, as could the Salazars in Sonora and Chihuahua, the Salgueiros in Chihuahua, or the Arzates in Baja California. The Sinaloa Cartel could even suffer an extreme fragmentation like that of the Beltrán Leyva organization after 2009, when more than 20 medium-sized and small regional organizations emerged from this cartel, many of which continue to fight over areas of Guerrero, Morelos, and the State of Mexico.
Of the three, this is the most unlikely, because it would imply that one of the two factions in conflict could defeat the other and reunite the organization under a single leadership. The only way this could happen is if one of the current leaders surrenders to the United States government in the coming weeks or months—for example, if Ismael Zambada Sicairos or Iván Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar surrenders, and members of their factions surrender to their rivals. But even then, it is not clear that the cells serving each faction will surrender easily. In the absence of “El Mayito Flaco,” the Cabreras of Durango or the Salazars of Sonora would prefer to become independent rather than align themselves with Los Chapitos, or if Iván Archivaldo were to be absent, it also seems unlikely that the Deltas of Sonora, the Chimales of Sinaloa, or the Salgueiros of Chihuahua would align themselves with La Mayiza.
Source: noroeste
