Donald Trump’s new offensive against Cuba introduces an additional variable into the already complex equation of Mexican foreign policy. The threat of imposing trade sanctions on countries that supply oil to the island is not merely an ideological gesture: it is a carefully designed instrument of pressure to act indirectly, shifting the cost of the punishment onto third parties.
In recent months, Mexico had become one of the main external suppliers of crude oil and fuels to Cuba. For Pemex, these shipments represent a marginal proportion of its total production; they do not alter its balance sheets or define its operational strategy. For Cuba, however, they constitute a critical input.
The Cuban economy has suffered for years from a structural energy fragility: limited electricity generation capacity, aging infrastructure, scarce access to external financing, and an almost total dependence on imported hydrocarbons, since its own production barely reaches 25,000 to 40,000 barrels of crude oil per day. In this context, Mexican oil has acted as a buffer against a crisis that would otherwise have been even deeper.
Trump seems to have precisely identified this point of pressure. Attacking the energy supply is not simply about reducing exports: it’s about affecting the operational heart of the Cuban economic system. Energy is the cross-cutting input that sustains transportation, food production, water pumping, hospital operations, and even minimal industrial activity.
When fuel is scarce, the effects are not distributed evenly or gradually; they concentrate in bottlenecks that paralyze large segments of daily life.
From an economic perspective, the internal impact in Cuba would be immediate and cumulative. Less energy means less production and more disruptions to activity, which in turn reduces the availability of basic goods. In an environment of price controls and rationed markets, scarcity translates not only into formal inflation but also into a real increase in the cost of accessing food, transportation, and services.
The social effect is equally significant. Prolonged blackouts, difficulties in getting around, and uncertainty about the supply of essential goods generate daily strain that doesn’t always manifest as open protests, but rather as persistent discontent. Recent experience shows that when energy shortages become chronic, daily life is organized around the scarcity: fragmented schedules, intermittent services, and a decline in quality of life. This scenario puts any political system under strain, even those with high levels of control.
On the political front, external pressure produces contradictory effects. On the one hand, it tends to reinforce the narrative of encirclement and resistance, which can unite the government apparatus against a clearly identified external adversary. On the other hand, it exposes the structural limitations of the model when the population perceives that scarcity is not episodic but permanent. Control can contain the visible conflict, but it doesn’t eliminate the silent erosion that accumulates when precariousness becomes normalized.
For Mexico, the situation presents a dilemma that extends beyond Cuba. On the external front, the threat of secondary sanctions presents the country with an uncomfortable choice: maintain energy support based on clear humanitarian arguments or reduce it to avoid trade retaliation from the United States. In a context where the bilateral relationship is already facing tensions over trade, security, and migration, adding another front increases the cost of any decision.
Source: elfinanciero
