New data on Trump and Mexico

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I’ll leave the analysis of the importance and content of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Mexico for later. For now, one can conclude that the Mexican side achieved some of what it wanted. They were looking, it seems to me, for a document they could present as an agreement between Mexico and the United States on security matters, complete with the classic flag salutes and commonplaces. Obviously, a joint communiqué or joint declaration is not an agreement, and reading the text reveals the enormous similarity this document bears to dozens of similar documents issued by both governments over the past 45 years.

I remember in particular—regarding the high-level group that will monitor these issues—how in 1981 my father created the Mexico-United States Joint Commission with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Every government creates its high-level group, every government seeks to monitor the issues, and every government insists on including references to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and, at least since Calderón, to arms trafficking in all declarations of this nature.

I think the most important thing for the presidency during this visit was not, however, the joint statement, but Rubio’s statements at his press conference. There, he declared that there had never been such close cooperation as with this administration, and that no country in the world cooperated as much with the United States as Mexico. This carries more weight for the regime than anything else, especially given the articles and columns, both inside and outside Mexico, according to which the United States was dissatisfied with Mexico’s levels of cooperation in this and other areas.

We will need to wait for the leaks to emerge to get an idea of ​​what was also said, or not said, during the talks between Rubio and the Mexican team. The United States already issued a statement yesterday afternoon on the topic of trade, which, of course, is not mentioned in the joint statement, but which, according to the State Department, was raised by Rubio, referring again to the 57 points of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and especially to Mexico’s non-compliance with the USMCA. We will also know, perhaps in the coming days, whether the topic of the United States destroying a boat loaded with cocaine in the Caribbean, near Venezuela, came up; whether Rubio raised the issue of Mexican aid to the Cuban dictatorship; and whether he also referred to the thorny issue of undocumented Mexicans who continue to arrive in the United States.

For now, I prefer to focus on some interesting data from Alejandro Moreno’s latest survey for El Financiero. The study focuses on relations between Mexico and the United States and the corresponding conduct by Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration. Although the number of people who consider relations to be good or very good has improved slightly (37%), 51% considered them to be bad or very bad. But there are two issues of concern. Although Sheinbaum’s rating of her relationship with Donald Trump improved, 56% of those interviewed rated it as bad or very bad, and only 28% rated it as good or very good. While the Mexican commentariat and much of the international media (for reasons worth investigating without being accused of political incorrectness) applaud Sheinbaum on this matter, Mexican society disapproves of her by a ratio of two to one. On some specific issues, approval is high: for example, on the handover of Mexican criminals to the United States.

The greatest cause for concern, however, lies in the survey’s final question: “Do you agree or disagree with using US military forces to combat criminal groups in Mexico?” Sixty-five percent disagreed (a ten-point drop from July), but 34% agreed. This figure rose ten points since July. In other words, one in three Mexicans approves, accepts, or favors US military forces fighting drug trafficking inside Mexico. This is a very high percentage: a third of the country. I doubt a similar proportion could be found in any other nation in the world. It’s certainly a minority, but it is a very large minority. This result is certainly echoed in internal government surveys, and perhaps explains why Sheinbaum tirelessly repeats that there will be no invasion, intervention, subordination, or any of those terms she likes so much.

It’s difficult to know if there is real US pressure to introduce military personnel into Mexico, but it’s not difficult to understand that the government resents the pressure coming from within Mexican society in this regard. And it’s worth remembering that this is a national average. In some states—Sinaloa, Guerrero, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Tamaulipas—the number of Mexicans eager to see the Marines fighting drug traffickers must be considerably higher.

Any telephone survey, even with a sample of 1,000 people, contains an inevitable bias, with a relative exclusion of the country’s most disadvantaged sectors. But even if it were only among the middle class, the numbers are alarming. Another question corroborates what we’ve already seen: “Should the Mexican government collaborate more with the United States against organized crime or should it defend national sovereignty and not allow the United States to interfere?” We return to the third who do agree with significant collaboration with the United States, with an increase of almost 20 points in the last month. What a challenge for Mexican society, for the government, and ultimately, for the United States.

Source: jorgecastaneda