For years, a large part of the public discourse on organized crime in Mexico was built around a relatively simple narrative: large cartels were opposing organizations disputing territories, routes, markets, and power. However, a revelation made by the Federal Security Secretary, Omar García Harfuch, during an official federal government press conference, forces a revision of that way of understanding the country’s criminal reality. By confirming the existence of an operational alliance between the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Los Chapitos faction, the government publicly recognized something that modifies the Mexican criminal map. What is relevant is not only that two rival groups can collaborate, but that the logic of their behavior seems much more complex and adaptable than traditional categories allow to explain.
The news is especially significant because it highlights a fundamental characteristic of contemporary organizations: their capacity to reorganize rapidly in the face of changing scenarios. While politics usually operates under electoral calendars, bureaucratic procedures, and partisan disputes, criminal organizations have the possibility to modify alliances, redefine strategies, and reconfigure structures with much greater speed. What yesterday seemed like an irreconcilable enmity can become a temporary association tomorrow if circumstances make it convenient.
From a sociological perspective, the phenomenon should not be surprising. Organizations do not survive because they are loyal to permanent principles, but because they develop mechanisms to reduce uncertainty and increase their probabilities of success. In that sense, criminal alliances function similarly to many political, economic, or military coalitions: they are formed when the benefits of cooperating temporarily outweigh the costs of conflict. The difference is that, in this case, the consequences translate into violence, territorial control, and the weakening of state capacities.
The Flexibility of the Criminal Map
The revelation also questions one of the favorite explanations of the political class: the idea that every security problem can be attributed to a specific, clearly identified group. When criminal organizations establish agreements, share resources, or coordinate operations, reality becomes much more difficult to observe and control. The crime map stops looking like a war between defined armies and begins to resemble a flexible network of actors capable of cooperating and competing simultaneously according to the opportunities in the environment.
The moment when this information emerges is not irrelevant either. While millions of people follow the excitement of the World Cup and public conversations concentrate on sporting results, celebrations, and national expectations, the government itself recognizes a transformation of enormous depth in the country’s criminal structure. This is not about minimizing the social importance of football, but about observing how collective communication systems usually displace certain problems temporarily while others continue to evolve outside the center of attention.
The Paradox of State Capacity
The paradox is evident. Never before has the Mexican State possessed so many technological resources, intelligence capacities, surveillance systems, and mechanisms of institutional coordination. However, criminal organizations continue to demonstrate an extraordinary capacity for adaptation. The problem no longer seems to be solely the strength of criminal groups, but the speed with which they learn, transform, and take advantage of the limitations of the institutions tasked with containing them.
Looking ahead to the 2027 elections, this situation raises questions that go far beyond public safety:
- What happens when criminal organizations acquire a capacity for adaptation superior to that of many democratic institutions?
- How can a territory be governed when illegal actors constantly modify their strategies?
- What does it mean to speak of state sovereignty when criminal networks operate across multiple regions and establish alliances that transcend political and administrative borders?
Perhaps the most important news of the day is not that the CJNG and Los Chapitos have collaborated. What is truly important is what that collaboration reveals about the country. While politics keeps thinking in terms of six-year terms (sexenios), campaigns, and candidacies, organized crime seems to be thinking in terms of permanent adaptation. And in an increasingly complex society, the advantage usually belongs not to the most powerful actor, but to the one that learns the fastest. While we were watching the World Cup, crime was reorganizing the country. And that is news whose consequences will probably last much longer than any football tournament.
Source: mexicodailypost
